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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Protection of
Commercial Speech-In Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.' the United States Su-
preme Court announced that "purely commercial speech"'2 is
entitled to first amendment protection. This was the first time
that the Court explicitly recognized that the Constitution does
not permit the government to regulate purely commercial ex-
pression without restraint. In a seven-to-one decision the Court
stated that:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to
who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indis-
pensable.
The case signifies the end of the "commercial speech doc-
trine"4 which originated in the 1942 decision of Valentine v.
Christensen.' In that case the Court said that "purely commer-
cial speech" was not entitled to constitutional protection.' The
precedent established in Valentine has been frequently criti-
cized, 7 and recent cases created serious doubts about its con-
1. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
2. The term "commercial speech" refers to expressions which are intended to in-
duce some kind of commercial interaction. Although "commercial speech" is possibly
a broader term than "advertising," in this article the two terms will be used
interchangeably. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1191 (1965). The term "purely commercial speech" refers to commercial speech
which provides information only about goods, services or some other form of commer-
cial enterprise, and adds nothing to the exchange of knowledge or ideas. In previous
cases the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between expressions which do
no more "than simply propose a commercial transaction" (that is, purely commercial
speech) and expressions which "contain factual material of clear 'public interest'."
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975). See also Population Services Int'l v.
Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), prob. juris noted, Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
3. 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
4. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
5. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
6. Id. at 54.
7. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 385 U.S. 498 (1958) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); see also materials at note 27 infra.
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tinuing validity.8 The Virginia Citizens case removed any lin-
gering questions; it is now clear that purely commercial speech
is entitled to first amendment protection.
The facts in the Virginia Citizens case were straightforward.
Virginia law required the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
(the defendant in the case) to regulate the profession of phar-
macology within that state.' The Board had authority to
license all pharmacists and to revoke the license of any
pharmacist who engaged in "unprofessional conduct." The sta-
tutory definition of unprofessional conduct included
"publish[ing], advertis[ing], or promot[ing] directly or in-
directly, in any manner whatsoever" the price of prescription
drugs.' In effect, the state legislature prohibited the advertise-
ment of the price of any prescription drug.
Two Virginia consumer organizations sought to enjoin the
Board of Pharmacy from enforcing the statutory proscriptions
against advertisements which included the prices of prescrip-
tion drugs. The consumer groups claimed that the prices of
pharmaceutical products varied considerably throughout the
state" and that the first amendment guaranteed the right of
Virginia citizens to have ready access to information about
these different prices. A federal district court agreed that Vir-
ginians did have a first amendment right to receive information
about drug prices and therefore enjoined the Board of Phar-
macy from enforcing the anti-advertising regulations. 2 The
Board appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the infor-
mation which was sought was "purely commercial speech,"
and therefore was not protected by the first amendment. The
Court affirmed the district court's decision striking down the
statute.
Before reaching the first amendment question, the Court
resolved the threshold issue of the plaintiffs' standing. Al-
though the statute was directed at pharmacists, the consumer
organizations asserted that the law interfered with the rights
of all of the citizens of the state. The plaintiffs did not claim
that their standing was derived from the pharmacists, who
8. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
9. 96 S. Ct. at 1820.
10. Id. at 1819 n.2.
11. Id. at 1821.
12. 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
could have alleged that the law restricted the exercise of their
first amendment freedoms. Instead, they claimed that the law
infringed directly on a right of the citizens of Virginia to receive
information .13
The district court not only accepted this argument, but also
used it as the rationale for finding that the consumers were in
a better position to challenge the law than the pharmacists
themselves. When the Virginia drug advertising law was chal-
lenged by a pharmacist in 1969, the constitutionality of the law
was upheld. 4 The success of the second challenge can be par-
tially attributed to a recognition that "the actual suitors are
consumers; their concern is fundamentally deeper than a trade
consideration."15
The view that freedom of speech encompasses a correspond-
ing right to receive information is not novel. Thus, it took only
a single paragraph in the Supreme Court's opinion to reach the
conclusion that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be as-
serted by these [consumers]."'1 7 This pronouncement legiti-
mizes the positions taken by several district courts. 8 The
Court's statement also should give encouragement to other
consumer groups challenging laws which allegedly interfere
with the public's right to be informed. Such groups have al-
ready challenged laws in other states which restrict advertise-
ments of prescription drugs," prescription eyeglasses,20 and
contraceptives.2'
This concern for the consumer seemed to be carried to an
extreme in the case of Population Services International v.
13. 96 S. Ct. at 1821.
14. 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
15. 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974).
16. See Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrines:
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775 (1975).
17. 96 S. Ct. at 1823.
18. A number of federal district courts have already adopted this position in cases
which are similar to the Virginia Citizens case. See, e.g., Terminal-Hudson Electronics
v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Terry v.
California State Board of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
19. Terry v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
20. Terminal-Hudson Electronics v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp.
1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
21. Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob.
juris. noted Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
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Wilson.2 This case was a complex action involving five
plaintiffs who attacked a New York law regulating the distribu-
tion of contraceptives. The plaintiffs were primarily sellers or
distributors of contraceptives. When the court considered the
standing of the various plaintiffs, it did not discuss the sellers'
own first amendment rights. Rather, the court said that the
sellers "have standing to represent the First Amendment rights
of New York State residents who are potential recipients of
information these plaintiffs might seek to. disseminate."
Thus, this New York district court implied that the sellers' first
amendment rights were derived from those who were in a better
position to assert such rights-the citizen-consumers. In past
cases involving commercial speech, the party challenging a
governmental restriction has usually been either a seller of
products or services, 4 or an advertiser of products and serv-
ices. 2 In future cases, it can be expected that challenges to
restrictions on commercial speech will be made not only by
speakers (sellers) or the media (advertisers), but also by recipi-
ents of such commercial speech (consumers). 21
After considering the preliminary question of standing, the
Court in Virginia Citizens turned to the applicability of the
commercial speech doctrine. This doctrine is an interpretation
of the first amendment under which speech which is classified
as "commercial speech" is not entitled to the same protections
given to other forms of speech. The history of the commercial
speech doctrine is well documented.? The origin of the doctrine
is considered to be the case of Valentine v. Christensen, 2 de-
cided in 1942. In that case the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a New York law that prohibited
the distribution of handbills which were intended to attract
22. Id.
23. Id. at 329.
24. See, e.g., Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't of Agriculture,
402 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
25. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
26. In addition to the Virginia Citizens case, see also cases cited at note 18 supra;
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitu-
tional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975).
27. See DeVore and Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 745 (1975); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commer-
cial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1970); Note,
Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HAnv. L. REV. 1191 (1965).
28. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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customers to a commercial enterprise. The Court indicated
that "purely commercial advertising" was not a form of speech
that the first amendment was intended to protect.
Following the Valentine decision, "commercial speech"
became a kind of "magical incantation"2 used to dismiss alle-
gations of governmental interference with first amendment
freedoms. Some courts held that Valentine did not stand for
the proposition that commercial speech was entitled to no pro-
tection whatsoever; however, a finding that commercial speech
was present almost always meant that the government regula-
tion under attack would be upheld.3 1 In other words, the courts
had a tendency to require much less justification for govern-
mental regulation of commercial speech than was required for
regulation of other types of speech.
The Valentine case remained the predominant Supreme
Court statement in the area of commercial speech until re-
cently. Since 1973 two other significant cases prior to Virginia
Citizens addressed the subject of commercial speech.3 In
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission32 the
Court refused to abandon the commercial speech doctrine in a
situation where the plaintiffs advertised activities which were
themselves illegal. [The advertisements allegedly suggested
that some job applicants should be given a preferred status on
the basis of their sex, and this sex discrimination was illegal.
However, the Court in Pittsburgh Press did indicate that the
commercial speech doctrine might be due for reevaluation.3 3 In
Bigelow v. Virginia34 the Court took another step toward re-
moving the distinction between commercial speech and the
29. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 592 (D. D.C. 1971)
(Wright, J., dissenting) aff'd mem., sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
30. Before the Pittsburgh Press and Bigelow decisions at least one district court
judge recognized that "[tihe commercial element does not altogether destroy its
[advertising's] quality as protected speech, but it does substantially reduce the
weight of the expression on constitutional scales." Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (Hofstedler, J., specially concurring).
31. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
33. The Court specifically avoided giving serious consideration to the continuing
validity of Valentine and stressed that its decision was not based on the fact that the
advertisements were commercial speech, but rather on the fact that the advertise-
ments were illegal. Id. at 389.
34. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
[Vol. 60:138
RECENT DECISIONS
more vigorously protected forms of expression. In that case the
Court held that a Virginia law which banned the advertisement
of abortion referral services violated the first amendment.
The Bigelow and Pittsburgh Press decisions made it clear
that the commercial speech doctrine had fallen into disfavor.
However, contrary to the claims of at least two district courts,
it is not entirely clear from these cases that the Valentine ra-
tionale "was sent to oblivion."35 The majority opinion in
Bigelow pointed out that the advertisement for the abortion
referral service was not a purely commercial dissemination of
information. The Court emphasized that the advertisement
under scrutiny was not intended solely for the purpose of selling
a service:
The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It con-
tained factual material of clear "public interest" ....
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed infor-
mation of potential interest and value to a diverse audience
-not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered
but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and
its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.36
It might have appeared from this statement that the Court was
still hesitant to extend first amendment protection to speech
which did no more than "simply propose a commercial transac-
tion." But this language was not sufficient to prevent one court
from reaching the following determination: "True enough,
Bigelow involved commercial advertising of an abortion refer-
ral service, while the issue before us is commercial advertising
35. Terminal-Hudson Electronics v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F.
Supp. 1075, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't
of Agriculture, 402 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 1975). The conclusions reached
by these two courts are quite different from the opinion reached by a New York state
court. The majority opinion in Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 371, 379
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1975), stated that:
The line differentiating unprotected commercial from "pure" speech was not
erased by Bigelow; rather it was redrawn with the recognition that some forms
of commercial speech should be entitled to First Amendment protection and
that the "commercial speech" label of Valentine v. Christensen [citation omit-
ted] did not appropriately demarcate the scope of First Amendment protection
of speech in a commercial context.
See also, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 111, 115-16 (1975).
36. 421 U.S. at 822.
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of margarine. Both involve commercial advertising and we see
no significant distinction between the two. '37
If Bigelow was intended to create a crucial distinction be-
tween advertisements which do something more than simply
propose a commercial transaction and those which do no more
than that, then the important distinction was diminished, in
the Virginia Citizens case. The Court recognized that the
speech involved in the Viriginia Citizens case was "purely com-
mercial" and that therefore "the question whether there is a
First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is
squarely before us. ' 38 The Court concluded that there is no
such exception.
Much of the reasoning behind the Court's decision stems
from the idea that "[s]ociety . . .may have a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information" because such infor-
mation helps the public to make more intelligent decisions.3 1
The first amendment represents the philosophy that a free
flow of ideas and opinions will allow truth to emerge.'" This
concept has frequently been invoked in cases involving the ex-
pression of political, economic, and religious opinions.' Now
the Court has held that the free flow of commercial information
is also in the best interest of society, and accordingly, the Court
has extended first amendment protection to this type of infor-
mation.
This extension of first amendment guarantees is not with-
out qualification. Now that commercial speech has been found
to deserve first amendment protection, more difficult questions
will arise concerning the nature and extent of the protection to
be given. The Supreme Court has provided at least a few guide-
lines to assist in answering these questions. In the future there
37. Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't of Agriculture, 402 F.
Supp. 1253, 1256 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1975). See also Terminal-Hudson Electronics v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
38. 96 S, Ct. at 1825.
39. Id. at 1827.
40. The first amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1943).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Martin v. Struthers, 318
U.S. 739 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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will be numerous challenges to laws which place restrictions on
commercial speech. 2 The Supreme Court's guidelines are pre-
sented here in the form of a list of factors which courts should
consider when entertaining challenges to these laws.
1. An initial factor to be considered is the legality of the
product or service which is being advertised. The Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized that:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which
might arguably outweigh the governmental interest support-
ing the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is
incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.43
At the time the Court made this observation in Pittsburgh
Press, it also pointed out by way of example that advertise-
ments "proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes""
could be constitutionally outlawed. However, problems can
arise where a product, service, or activity is legal in one state,
but illegal in the state where it is being advertised. Bigelow v.
Virginia provides strong authority for an argument that a state
has no legitimate reason for preventing its citizens from receiv-
ing information about legal activities in a sister state, even if
these activities are illegal in a state where the information is
being made available through advertising.4"
2. Courts should also consider the form of the advertising
which is being regulated. In other words, is the challenged
42. In the aftermath of the Pittsburgh Press case and the Bigelow case there has
been a variety of cases involving commercial speech issues. See, e.g., Howard v. Supe-
rior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 722, 125 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1975) (statute prohibiting adver-
tisement of divorce assistance services); Welton v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. App.
3d 803, 124 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1975) (ordinance prohibiting sale of maps to movie stars'
homes); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., - Mass. -, 339
N.E.2d 709 (1975) (regulations on billboards); State v. Cardwell, 539 P.2d 169 (Ore.
App. 1975) (obscenity in advertising). Certainly more challenges to state and munici-
pal regulations of advertising can be anticipated after the Virginia Citizens case.
43. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
44. Id. at 388.
45. The Bigelow case involved advertisements calling attention to the availability
of abortions in New York. The advertisement appeared in a Virginia newspaper at a
time when abortions were still illegal in Virginia. The Supreme Court held that "[a
state] may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of
another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that
State." 421 U.S. at 824-25.
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regulation directed specifically at television or radio,46 news-
papers,4 7 billboards or other signs in public places," or "door-
to-door" types of advertising?" A complete analysis of the
constitutional problems related to various forms of advertising
is beyond the scope of this article. However, it should be noted
that the court in Virginia Citizens did indicate that the form
of advertising is a relevant factor in determining the constitu-
tionality of a law which restricts the exercise of commercial
speech. The majority opinion pointed out that "the special
problems of the electronic media are . . . not in this case." 55
The Court also drew attention to the fact that the drug price
advertising ban was more than "a mere time, place and man-
ner restriction."5' The Court could have added that the restric-
tions were not designed to protect the privacy of citizens52 or
to prevent the advertiser's message from being thrust upon
them as a captive audience."' States have been allowed to place
limited types of restrictions on other kinds of expression which
are protected by the first amendment, and the Court in Vir-
ginia Citizens seemed to be saying that these restrictions will
continue to be approved in commercial speech cases.
3. Another relevant factor is the elusive "public interest"
element,54 i.e., an advertisement's contribution to matters of
concern to society. The Court did not point directly to this
"public interest" value of an advertisement as a factor to be
considered in cases involving the regulation of commercial
speech. In fact, the major point of the Court's decision ap-
46. See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd mem. sub noma. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972).
47. See, e.g., cases cited at note 25 supra.
48. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); John Don-
nelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., - Mass. -. , 339 N.E. 2d 709 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
50. 96 S. Ct. at 1831.
51. Id. at 1830; See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
52. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
53. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974), quoting
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
54. The fact that a commercial expression provides some information of interest
to the public has frequently been found to be significant. The Supreme Court stressed
the public interest element in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The problem with this public interest
factor (which causes it to be "elusive") is that it is difficult to standardize. Who should
determine what is of interest to the public?
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peared to be that purely commercial speech is to be given the
same protection as that which is afforded to advertisements
that do something more than "simply propose a commercial
.transaction." Nevertheless, the majority and concurring opin-
ions suggested that an advertisement which contains some
kind of ideological expression, in addition to a commercial
message, will receive a greater degree of first amendment pro-
tection. It was unequivocally stated that commercial speech
can be treated differently from other forms of expression."5 If
there are "important differences between commercial price and
product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological commu-
nication on the other," 6 then it follows that there is still a
difference between purely commercial advertising, and adver-
tising which contains "factual material of clear 'public inter-
est'. ' ' 57 This public interest element was at the center of the
Bigelow decision, and there is reason to believe that it has not
been abandoned as a factor to be considered.
4. Courts which are required to review laws affecting ad-
vertising practices should consider whether the purpose of the
challenged law is to protect the public from false or misleading
advertisements.58 The Virginia Citizens case made clear that a
law which is intended to stop false or deceptive advertising
should normally be deemed constitutional. Mr. Justice Stewart
wrote a separate opinion in order to emphasize this point. 9
Relying heavily on the Court's decision in a recent libel case, 0
Justice Stewart stressed that "[t]here is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact."" He also pointed out: "Since
the factual claims contained in commercial price or product
55. In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There
are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more than propose
a commercial transaction' [citation ommitted] and other varieties. Even if the
differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless,
and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest
that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.
96 S. Ct. at 1830 n.24.
56. Id. at 1834 (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 1825.
58. See generally Note, Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
59. 96 S. Ct. at 1832.
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61. 96 S. Ct. at 1833, quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 440 (1974).
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advertisements relate to tangible goods or services, they may
be tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth without
in any manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of
thought.
2
The Court has said that the Constitution requires toleration
of false statements made in the context of an exchange of ideas,
because protection of this type of "ideological expression" is
the overriding concern of the first amendment. 3 Since "under
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea,""
false statements made during an exchange of ideas are pro-
tected. However, there is such a thing as a false advertisement,
and false statements in the context of commercial advertising
should not be constitutionally protected from governmental
controls.
5. The final factor to be considered is the special status
which has been traditionally accorded to certain professions,
most notably doctors and lawyers. This final consideration is
not yet fully established, and future decisions will be necessary
in order to determine to what extent this is really a relevant
consideration.6 5 In Virginia Citizens the majority opinion allot-
ted only a footnote to deal with the obvious questions concern-
ing the effect which the decision would have on the legal and
medical professions. This footnote warned that readers of the
Court's opinion should not automatically assume that prohibi-
tions against the advertisement of legal and medical services
will soon be struck down.
Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the
distinctions, historical and functional, between professions,
may require considerations of quite different factors. Physi-
62. Id. at 1835.
63. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), the Court stated:
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times,
resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent
in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation
have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses
and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 1835 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
65. "It is important to note that the Court wisely leaves these issues [concerning




cians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility
for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain
kinds of advertising. 6
The separate opinion written by Chief Justice Burger was pri-
marily an amplification of this statement about the special
considerations which might arise in cases involving physicians
and attorneys."
The reasoning which convinced the Court that information
about drug prices should be readily available can probably be
applied to information about legal and medical services. Infor-
mation about professional services is certainly of as much in-
terest to the public as drug prices, and would most likely help
the public to make better informed decisions. However, the
point made in the Court's footnote and the Chief Justice's
opinion is that the government might have a greater interest
in regulating advertisements dealing with professional services
than it does in regulating advertisements of drug prices. A state
has an interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens, and this interest allows a state to regulate the
practice of law and medicine, as well as other professions and
trades." If a state can convincingly demonstrate that it is nec-
essary to regulate advertisements of certain professional serv-
ices in order to insure that those professions will maintain high
standards, then those regulations will probably be upheld. It
remains to be seen whether or not such convincing demonstra-
tions can be provided.
The Court has considered the governmental interest in reg-
ulating various professions in previous cases. 9 These cases have
primarily involved fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection issues, but they seem to indicate that the
Court believes that a state has a very significant interest in
regulating the conduct of professionals. In the recent case of
66. 96 S. Ct. at 1831 n. 25.
67. Id. at 1831 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68. See, e.g. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234, 237 n.2 (S.D. fll.), afl'd,
423 U.S. 1009 (1975) (state's interest in regulating practice of law by out-of-state
attorneys); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935)
(regulations imposed on the practice of dentistry).
69. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar ° the Court specifically empha-
sized the governmental interest in regulating the legal profes-
sion.7'
A further argument that has been suggested as a justifica-
tion for bans on advertisements of legal and medical services
is that such advertising will necessarily tend to be misleading.
As mentioned above, false or misleading advertising is not con-
stitutionally protected. This is apparently what Chief Justice
Burger had in mind when he wrote:
I doubt that we know enough about evaluating the quality
of medical and legal services to know which claims of superi-
ority are "misleading" and which are justifiable. Nor am I
sure that even advertising the price of certain professional
services is not inherently misleading since what the profes-
sional must do will vary greatly in individual cases."
Therefore, despite Justice Rehnquist's opinion to the con-
trary,73 it would appear that there is good reason to suspect that
at least some type of restrictions on advertising by the legal and
medical professions will be permitted.
The five factors discussed above have been presented as a
simplified list and not as a comprehensive analysis. Not all of
these factors will be relevant to every case involving commer-
70. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Goldfarb case was an antitrust action brought against
a bar association that maintained a "minimum fee schedule." First amendment issues
were not considered. It is interesting to note however, that one of the defenses asserted
by the bar association was that it should not be subject to antitrust regulations since
it was an agency of the state. The Court rejected the argument stating that "[tihe
fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an
antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its
members." Id. at 791. The Court did not find sufficient "state action" to protect the
bar association from the antitrust charges. Id. This raises the question of whether or
not the Court would find sufficient "state action" so that the first amendment (through
the fourteenth amendment) could be applied to a state bar association.
71. "The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since law-
yers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and
have historically been 'officers of the courts'." Id. at 792.
72. 96 S. Ct. at 1832.
73. Justice Rehnquist stated that:
[If the sale limitation on permissible state proscription of advertising is that
it may not be false or misleading, surely the difference between pharmacists'
advertising and lawyers' and doctors' advertising can be only one of degree and
not of kind. I cannot distinguish between the public's right to know the price of
drugs and its right to know the price of title searches or physical examinations




cial speech, but it is difficult to imagine a case which will not
require a consideration of some of these factors. In the Virginia
Citizens case, the Court did not discuss all of the five factors
extensively, but it did give at least some consideration to most
of them.
The Court considered these factors as a part of the process
of weighing the first amendment rights claimed by the plain-
tiffs against the reasons for maintaining the advertising regula-
tions which were asserted by the Board of Pharmacy. "This
case presents a fairly typical First Amendment problem - that
of balancing interests in individual free speech against public
welfare determinations embodied in a legislative enactment."
The majority of the Court would probably agree with this state-
ment of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Virginia
Citizens. However, the majority of the Court found that the
balance in this case tipped in favor of the "interests in individ-
ual free speech," whereas Justice Rehnquist believed that the
"public welfare determinations embodied in [the] legislative
enactment" should prevail. The Court gave extensive consider-
ation to the justifications which were offered by the defendant
Board of Pharmacy in support of the Virginia ban on prescrip-
tion drug advertisements. It conceded that the state had an
interest in maintaining professionalism on the part of pharma-
cists; but the Court concluded that because the advertising
prohibition did not "directly affect professional standards one
way or the other,"75 the attempted justifications of it failed.
Prior to recent developments, a regulation which restricted
purely commercial speech could normally be upheld, because
first amendment considerations were thought to be irrelevant.
When this situation existed, the crucial concern was whether
the speech which was being regulated was in fact "purely com-
mercial." The significance of the Virginia Citizens decision is
that it is no longer essential to consider whether the restricted
form of expression is of a purely commercial nature. Virginia
Citizens stated that first amendment considerations are rele-
vant even if a case does involve purely commercial speech; thus
the crucial concern has changed.
Future cases will determine the extent of the first amend-
ment protection which will be made available to commercial
74. Id. at 1839.
75. Id. at 1829.
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speech. The importance of allowing a free flow of commercial
information will have to be weighed against the importance of
the restriction which is being challenged. This must be done on
a case by case basis, and the weighing process should involve
consideration of the factors which have been outlined above.
Another case involving commercial speech has been appealed
to the Supreme Court, and hopefully it will give the Court an
opportunity to elaborate on the Virginia Citizens rationale."5
However, it appears today that the Court is unwilling to give
the fullest measure of first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech.
PAUL M. LOHMANN
Constitutional Law-Federal Civil Rights Act-Absolute
Immunity Extended to Prosecuting Attorney-In the recent
case of Imbler v. Pachtman,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a prosecuting attorney, acting within the scope of his
duties in initiating and prosecuting a case, has absolute im-
munity from liability for damages for alleged violations of an-
other's constitutional rights under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. 2 In so holding the court further limited the effect
of section 1983 in civil tort actions and elevated the position of
prosecuting attorney to the same protected status enjoyed by
judges3 and grand jurors4 acting within the scope of their du-
ties. This article will discuss the decision and attempt to ana-
76. Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)
prob. juris. noted Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
1. 96 S. Ct. 982 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was originally passed as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, and reads in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
3. See, e.g., Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
835 (1953); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
4. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356
(1872).
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